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DUE PROCESS OF LAW-THE RIGHT TO
CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE
WITNESSES IN INVESTIGATIONS
The Civil Rights Commission' issued subpoenaes duces tecum
to certain voting registrars of the State of Louisiana commanding
them to appear at a hearing in answer to charges that certain
Negroes had been denied the right to vote because of their race, a
violation of Federal law. 2 The Commission refused to name the
informants, or to reveal the exact charges filed, and denied the
registrars the right to confront and cross-examine the informants.
A suit was brought against the Commission to enjoin the proposed
hearing on grounds that the procedures sought to be used denying
these rights were beyond the Commission's authority and denied
them the Constitutional safeguards of confrontation and crossexamination. 3 The Federal District Court avoided the Constitutional
question by declaring the procedures adopted by the Commission
not authorized by Congress and void. 4 On appeal the United States
Supreme Court in a 7-2 decision reversed and held further that the
denial of the right to confront and cross-examine the informants
would not deny the petitioners due process of law. 5
Administrative agencies and fact-finding committees have
assumed a major role in Government. Some of the various procedures adopted in their proceedings have resulted in serious con'The Civil Rights Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission,
is a temporary agency, created in the Executive Branch of the Federal

Government to investigate allegations made under affidavit that certain
citizens of the United States are being deprived of their right to vote by
reason of their color, race, religion, or national origin. 71 Stat. 634 (1957),

42 U.S.C. § 1975 (1958).
218 U.S.C. § 242 provides:

"Whoever, under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of
any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or
laws of the United States or to different punishments, pains, or penalties,
on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or
race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."
3The registrars also challenged the hearings on grounds that the act under
which the Commission operated was not appropriate legislation under the
Constitution, and on grounds that the procedures used by the Commission are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act § 7, 60 Stat.
241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1958). Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
4 Larche v. Hannah, 177 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. La. 1959).

5Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).

NOTES
stitutional questions. The Hannah case presents such a question
concerning confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. The
broad questions presented are: (1) When is the right to a full
hearing required by the Due Process Clause; and (2) When are
informal, shortened hearings allowed. Due Process of Law is an
elusive concept which embodies the fundamental principles of
liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political
6
institutions.
There are at least two distinctions commonly made in requiring or denying a full hearing in various proceedings. In Hannah
the court relied heavily on the distinction between judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings, which require the constitutional safeguards of a full hearing, and pure investigating or fact-finding proceedings, which do not. 7 This distinction is recognized in the
Administrative Procedure Act which requires ". . . such crossexamination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of
the facts" in adjudication proceedings and rule making proceedings
only.8 The reason for this distinction would seem to be the desire
to protect persons who would be adversely affected by the adjudication or ruling, while in other proceedings no action is taken and no
rights are directly injured. Our courts have, where public policy
requires, recognized keeping the identity of informers secret, but
the rights of the accused are also recognized and the privilege fails
when disclosure of the informant's identity is essential to a fair
determination of the issues. 9
The problem of what is an investigation has caused little
difficulty. Investigations are ". . . informal proceedings held to
obtain information to govern future action and are not proceedings
in which action is taken against anyone."'10 The Commission is
clearly within this definition." The presumption behind the distinction between investigations and other proceedings is that if no

6Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
7Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).

860 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1958).

9For a general development of the rule see Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53 (1957), Annot., 1 L. Ed. 2d 1998 (1958); Scher v. United States,
305 U.S. 251 (1938); Dellastatious v. Boyce, 152 Va. 368, 147 S.E. 267
(1929). Cf. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (3rd ed. 1940).
10 Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787, 788 (7th Cir. 1944). Cf. Norwegian Nitrogen
Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
11The Commission has no power to act or ordain. Its sole function is to
investigate and report to Congress and the President of the United States.
71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (1958).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 40, 1961
action is to be taken against anyone, no rights are infringed and
the safeguards of a trial are not necessary.
The other basic Constitutional distinction commonly made is
between being deprived of vested interests and being deprived of
mere expectations. In one case the right of confrontation and crossexamination was denied a resident alien who had been refused2
discretionary relief from deportation by the Attorney General.1
Any relief given by him was by law only a matter of grace and not
of right and therefore only expectations were denied. It is clear
that no vested interests were involved there but the distinction is
not always so sharp. When an alien immigrant returned to the
United States after a nineteen month absence, he was permanently
excluded from the Country on information of a confidential nature,
the disclosure of which the court felt would be prejudicial to the
public interest. 13 The proceeding was termed merely an exclusionary action involving no vested interests instead of a deportation
action and therefore no constitutional rights were denied. On the
other hand when the proceedings directly deprived a lawful resident alien of reentry into the United States, a full hearing with
right to confront and cross-examine was held necessary for due
14
process of law.
Security is an area which highlights a conflict between individual rights and the public interest. When the natural result
of revoking a man's security clearance was the loss of his job it
was held that there was no authority to deny the security clearance
without giving the right of confrontation and cross-examination. 15
But where the government was able to show that the nation's
security program would be destroyed by allowing confrontation
and cross-examination to seamen who were denied security clearance and therefore denied jobs, due process was held not violated. 16
An examination of these cases indicates that what the courts
will determine to be a vested interest or merely an expectation
varies with the relative strength of the public interest involved7
in denying the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.1
12Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
13Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). Cf. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
14 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
15 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). See also Bailey v. Richardson,
182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court,
341 U.S. 918 (1951), and Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
16Parker v. Lester, 112 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Calif. 1953).
17

See cases cited in notes 12 to 16 supra, and Appendix to majority opinion
of Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 454 (1960).
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Investigation of "communists" is a recent example of how the
government may injure a person by its acts even though there is
no direct action taken-only investigations made. The rights of the
individual were upheld when public investigations of suspected
were
communists by the House Un-American Activities Committee
18
When
exposure.
of
sake
the
for
struck down as unlawful exposure
the Attorney General of the United States composed a list of
"communistic" organizations without notice and a full hearing, it
was held that the Constitution guaranteed freedom from unjustified
19
governmental defamation. The injury there was indirect, through
that seriously hampered "blackreaction
public
the stigma and
listed" organizations. But even these cases do not hold that indirect
and collateral deprivations of life, liberty, or property are protected
by the Fifth Amendment; only that the action was not a proper
legislative function.
Variable as it may be, as the rule appears now, the right to a
full hearing is required in a proceeding in which some direct action
is taken against a person either through adjudication or rule
making, and then only if the action taken deprives that person of
life, liberty or property as distinguished from the deprivation of an
expectation. But a full hearing seems not to be required if there is
no direct action taken, regardless of a collateral deprivation of life,
liberty, or property. The registrars in Hannah cannot demand a
full hearing under this test since the Commission only investigates
20
and reports its findings and has no power to act or ordain. The
real question raised in Hannah is therefore whether the right to
confront and cross-examine informants should be limited to proceedings in which some type of direct action is taken against someone, or whether that right should extend to collateral and indirect
deprivations of life, liberty, or property resulting from pure investigative proceedings.
The dissent in Hannahargues that due process is violated whenever Government action injures an individual without an opportunity to show that the evidence is untrue, and even though no
affirmative action is taken, no indictment is returned, no commit21
ment to jail is made, and no formal criminal charges are filed.
The injury likely to result is further aggravated when the pro-

18 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
19 Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
Stat. 635 (1957), 420 U.S.C. § 1975c (a) (1958).
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 493 (1960).

2071
21
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ceedings may be open to the public, the press, and television
22
cameras.
It can truthfully be said that persons accused of committing
crimes are deprived of liberty when they are forced under subpoena
to testify in answer to questions concerning their alleged illegal
activities.13 But Hannah indicates that there was no injury shown
that was not purely conjectural and even if collateral consequences
did follow the hearing it would not be due to affirmative action
of the Commission and therefore made no difference. 24 The registrars in Hannah have no choice but to answer the subpoenas and
are subject to contempt of court if they do not.2 5 The investigations
of the Commission are similar to those of a grand jury in which
there is clearly no right to confrontation and cross-examination of
witnesses, 26 but a grand jury, composed of impartial citizens, is a
protection against oppressive public prosecution.2 7 There is no
assurance that evidence given by the registrars will not be used
in a later prosecution, and there is a probability that any incriminating evidence will result in prosecution.2 8 The Fifth Amendment
plea of self-incrimination may be available but it in itself has shortcomings and is undesirable, especially in public hearings. 29 The
injury is not limited to potential criminal prosecution but includes

rules of the Commission provide: "Subject to the physical limitations
of the hearing room and consideration of the physical comfort of Com-

22The

mission members, staff, and witnesses, equal and reasonable access for
coverage of the hearings shall be provided to the various means of communications, including newspapers, magazines, radio, news reels, and
television. However no witness shall be televised, filmed or photographed

during the hearings if he objects on the grounds of distraction, embarassment, or physical handicap." Id. at 500, n.3.
23
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); In re Hearing Before Joint

Legislative Comm., 187 S.C. 1, 196 S.E. 164 (1938); In re Grae, 282 N.Y.
428, 26 N.E.2d 963 (1940).
24
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 443 (1960).
2571 Stat. 636 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975d (g) (1958).
26
United States v. Central Supply Ass'n, 34 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1940).
27

Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1
(1887).
2842 U.S.C. § 1975c (a) authorizes investigations of allegations which if
true constitute Federal crimes and § 1975c (b) requires the Commission
to report to the President, whose duty is to uphold the laws of the land.
It seems reasonable to draw the conclusion that prosecution will follow.
29

See Williams, Problems of, the Fifth Amendment, 24 FORDHAM L. REV.
19 (1955); Noonan, Inferences from the Invocation of the Privelege
against Self-incrimination,41 VA. L. REV. 311 (1955).
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accompany it even though
public scorn and the prejudices that
30
the witness is guilty of no misconduct.
To grant the requested rights to confront and cross-examine
informants means that informants would be subject to intimidation.
It must be recognized that in this period of high racial feeling,
Negroes in Louisiana would be extremely reluctant to come forth
with accusations, were their identity subject to disclosure, and the
Commission would be severely hampered or perhaps thereby completely sterilized. Therefore the public interest in not disclosing
the informant's identity is great, and the function of the Commission is in the public interest. But the Commission is investigating for purposes of corrective legislation and it seems this function
would not absolutely require the testimony of the accused registrars
to act effectively in its reporting capacity.
In view of the increasing popularity of investigations, danger
of erosion of constitutional rights lies in restricting the right of
confrontation and cross-examination to proceedings which act
directly to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property. The
guide should be whether or not the necessary or probable result of
the proceedings will be to injure those persons, whether directly or
collaterally.
Jim Janke, '61

PERSONAL INJURY AND
RES-JUDICATAVEHICLE PROPERTY DAMAGE ARISING
FROM A SINGLE ACCIDENT
The following situation illustrates a common occurrence in
Nebraska: X suffers personal injuries and his car is damaged as
a result of an automobile accident. The first question which arises
is whether X has one, or more than one, cause of action. If the cause
of action is single, then a judgment on the property damage claim
is a bar to a later action for the personal injury and vice versa.
This is so because the rule against splitting a single cause of action
makes the judgment in the first proceedings res judicata in the
second. A second question arises if the insurer reimburses X for
his property damage loss and thereafter sues as subrogee. Does a
30 Cf. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). See also Note, 26 TEMP.
L.Q. 70 (1952); Jones, Congress and Television: A Dissenting Opinion,
37 A.B.A.J. 392 (1951).

